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Abstract
The paper describes Small Data Acquisition System, named PACQ, which can be used for
collecting data from user-programmable I/O modules and sharing data through a web browser.
All connections and data transfers between the client and the server are secure. Due to the
resource restrictions only symmetric cryptography and challenge-response protocol could be
used, but the solution should be resistant to most of common attacks.
1. Introduction
Development of science constantly increases requirements for technical de-
vices. This rule can be observed in many fields, but especially in electronics
and computer technology. Due to popularity of the Internet, many devices,
even small ones, transfer data using the global network. For some people it
creates temptation to steal private information. Unprotected or poorly pro-
tected network systems are exposed to a risk of losing data, or even control.
Especially dangerous are cases in which an intruder in a tricky way wants to
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situations, it is necessary to implement user authentication and encryption of
transmitted data and to introduce other solutions which impede breaking of
security protection. Although there is a large group of solutions guaranteeing
a high degree of security, not all of them can be applied in every case. One of
the reasons is insufficient computing performance of a processor. For devices
based on small microcontrollers, with strongly limited resources, it is usually
not possible to use asymmetric cryptography. Simpler solutions have to be used
instead, but providing a similar level of security. The solution presented in the
paper is implemented in a small data acquisition system (PACQ), in which data
collected in control and acquisition systems are shared by a small server with
secure remote access and data encryption.
For a few years, a team from the Department of Computer and Control Engi-
neering at Rzeszo´w University of Technology, whose members are the authors of
the paper, cooperates with the companies Lumel S.A. from Poland and Praxis
Automation Technology B.V. from the Netherlands. The examples of coop-
eration results are CPDev engineering environment for programming control
devices in the languages of IEC 61131-3 standard or algorithms for self-tuning
of PID controllers. The solution, presented in the paper, is another proposition,
this time for secure collection of data from remote monitoring stations as well
as remote control of devices in small distributed systems. The authors hope
that the proposed solution can be applied in future products.
2. PACQ system
PACQ is a prototype of small distributed control and measurement system
developed at Rzeszo´w University of Technology. It is designed mainly for data
acquisition, but simple control, through programmable I/O modules, is also
possible. The main component of the system is a PACQ server, which is a
microprocessor device for recording measurement data transmitted from I/O
modules through a RS-232/485 converter and built-in a simple web server.
Collected data, current or archived, can be viewed by the user via the web
browser.
The system consists of several control modules and the main data acquisition
with WWW server (Fig. 1). The control modules equipped with inputs and
outputs are programmed in the CPDev environment in ST, FBD or IL languages
[1]. Process variables are exposed by the modules to the PACQ server via a
custom, Modbus-like communication protocol. The collected data is stored in
the server database.
Communication with I/O modules is done within the industrial network, for
which it is assumed that access to it is available only to authorized persons.
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Fig. 1. Topology of PACQ system.
There is no possibility for outsiders to get uncontrolled access to the system
resources. So there are no worries about data security from this point of view.
But the web server is another case. The data is transmitted through the public
network, and access to all information is permitted for each user who knows
the username and password. What’s more, it is assumed that the network
infrastructure, in which the server operates, may be administrated by fraudulent
company. The company all privileges and has full access to the local network.
It is also assumed, that someone may try to connect to the network and break
the security protection.
The PACQ server bases on a microcontroller with highly limited resources
and a very simple operating system. It is not able to use advanced encryption
solutions due to insufficient computing power of the microcontroller.
The website is available only to the registered users who previously received
their own usernames and passwords. They may have administrator (advanced
user) or common user privileges, depending on their functions. The first of them
can read the recorded data, adjust the input and output of I/O modules and
make changes to system configuration. The others can only read the recorded
data. For security reasons, some functionalities of the system, such as defining
users, changing passwords, and configuring system-critical settings are possible
only through specialized application via RS-232 interface of the PACQ server.
Prototype of the PACQ server has been developed on the EVBnet02 evalu-
ation board (Fig. 2) [2]. The board is equipped with Atmel AVR ATmega128
microcontroller, RAM and DataFlash memories, 10Mbit/s Ethernet controller,
2xUART, RTC, LCD display and 4 buttons. WWW and FTP services run
under the Nut/OS operating system [3]. A dedicated master-slave protocol
similar to Modbus is used to communicate with the modules.
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 9/25/15 2:52 PM




90 Dariusz Rzon´ca, Andrzej Stec
Fig. 2. Prototype board for the PACQ server (EVBnet-02 from Propox [2]).
Fig. 3. Basic components of the server program.
Software for the PACQ server has been written in C. The application part
consists of three major components (Fig. 3):
• serial communication subsystem for acquiring data from control mod-
ules,
• archiving service for storing the data in a database,
• web server CGI extensions and cryptography module for generating
dynamic web pages.
Each of these components is serviced by a separate thread of the operating
system.
Based on the configuration data stored in a file, the server program period-
ically polls the appropriate I/O modules. Details of the communication with
the control modules as well as a hierarchical model in timed coloured Petri nets
and simple performance analysis were presented in [4]. Each control module can
service from a few to tens of data channels. The current version of the PACQ
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Fig. 4. Prototype board for I/O module (AT91SAM7S-EK from Atmel).
system supports up to 64 channels. Read values are stored in a current-data
table and simultaneously archived in a database. These data are available for
users in a form of dynamically generated web pages. This is accomplished by
the CGI scripts implemented in the operating system and the POST method
for data processing of forms. When the connection is established a session key
is generated. This key is used for further data encryption. Due to the use of
AES-128 algorithm in the CTR mode, each message differs from the previous
one, even if it contains the same information. Details of the security algorithms
are presented in sect. 3.
Control modules in the PACQ system are small programmable controllers
equipped with analog or binary inputs and outputs. The module is based
on the development board AT91SAM7S-EK from Atmel [5] (Fig. 4) with the
ARM7 microcontroller. The board has been equipped with extra I/O hardware
and RS-485 bus. Each module can be programmed to perform process control.
Programs are written in CPDev (Control Program Developer) engineering
environment developed at Rzeszo´w University of Technology [1]. CPDev inte-
grates tools for programming, simulation, hardware configuration, on-line test-
ing and running control applications. Programs can be written in ST and IL
textual languages (Structured Text, Instruction List) and in FBD graphical
one (Function Block Diagram), according to the IEC 61131-3 standard [6].
Main window of CPDev environment with programs in ST and FBD is shown
in Fig. 5. I/O module application runs user programs (from CPDev) under
control of FreeRTOS operating system [7].
As it was mentioned before, the data collected from I/O modules can be
observed by viewing a web page prepared by the PACQ server. More detailed
description is provided in sect. 4.
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Fig. 5. Main window of CPDev programming environment.
3. Security aspects
During remote access to the device (via Ethernet), there is a risk of disclosing
confidential data or introducing unauthorized changes of configuration. It is
necessary to use appropriate mechanisms to ensure transmission security. In
particular, such mechanisms shall provide authentication, confidentiality and
integrity. Unfortunately, limited resources of the microserver force us to develop
a specific solution, different from those typically used in large systems, however,
providing a sufficient level of security, despite limited hardware. In particular,
algorithms based on the asymmetric key should be avoided, and only symmetric
key cryptography can be used due to low microprocessor performance.
Authentication of the user is based on username (ID) and password. The
password has to be defined earlier, via secure channel (in service mode during
local serial port connection by a special program). This password is stored in
the PACQ in a hashed form, together with random salt. This way there is
no possibility to read the password from the device, it is known only to the
user. Common attack on the hashed passwords involves using a precomputed
lookup table of hashes for typical passwords to reverse hash function. Usually
rainbow tables instead simple lookup tables are used as a time-memory tradeoff.
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Fig. 6. Authentication process in the PACQ server.
Employing the random salt and running the hash function multiple times (key
stretching), according to PBKDF2 [8], make such an attack infeasible.
The authentication process and format of the transmitted messages are shown
in Fig. 6.
To avoid transmitting the password in a plain text during the authorization
process we decided to use the challenge-response protocol [9]. The protocol is
used to authenticate the user, and to generate a unique session key used later
to encrypt the transmission. The challenge-response protocol used in PACQ is
shown in Fig. 7.
Authorization and encryption are performed by a special intermediary appli-
cation which makes a secure tunnel between PACQ and the web viewer. The
operator enters the ID (transmitted to the device in a plain text) and password
(not transmitted). PACQ answers with a generated random number and the
salt connected with the ID. On the client side, the password is hashed together
with salt making so-called secret key. The identical secret key is read from
the database on the server side. On both sides, independently the secret key
is hashed together with the random number. One part of this calculation is
transmitted to the PACQ – the correct value means successful authentication.
The remaining part of the hash makes a session key, generated on both sides,
used later to encrypt the transmission, and MAC key.
Commonly AES-128 [10] is used as a cipher and SHA-256 [11] as a hash
function are used, however, we decided to choose the CTR (Counter) mode
(Fig. 8) as a cipher mode of operation.
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Fig. 7. Challenge-response protocol.
Fig. 8. Block cipher in the Counter (CTR) mode.
The CTR mode, in fact, turns the block cipher (AES) into a stream cipher.
The sequential numbers (counter) together with the initialization vector (IV)
are encrypted by AES using the session key. The AES output is XOR-ed
with a plaintext message to create a ciphered message. This way identical
plaintext messages are encrypted to different ciphertexts, unlike in the simple
ECB (Electronic codebook) mode.
This mode provides confidentiality, but integrity of the message is not guar-
anteed. An attacker during man-in-the-middle attack is not able to decrypt the
message, however he can blindly modify the encrypted message in a random
way and change its meaning (see Fig. 9). Moreover, if the attacker can guess
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 9/25/15 2:52 PM




Small prototype acquisition system with . . . 95
Fig. 9. Blind man-in-the-middle attack.
Fig. 10. Man-in-the-middle attack with guessed message.
the plaintext message he can use it to obtain the cipher stream and prepare a
spoofed message to perform malicious actions (Fig. 10). Such guess might be
possible because industrial applications often behave in a predictable way, e.g.
issue the ”read configuration” command at the beginning of the connection.
To avoid spoofing integrity of the received messages must be confirmed. In
our case integrity of the transmission is guaranteed by appropriate MAC –
Message Authentication Code (HMAC – Hash-based Message Authentication
Code [12]). HMAC calculation is shown in Fig. 11. The MAC key is XOR-ed
with inner and outer paddings. The keyed inner padding is concatenated with
the message and hashed. Hash result is concatenated with the keyed outer
padding and hashed again to produce HMAC of the message.
To minimize probability of a successful dictionary attack, the password has to
fulfil requirements about the length (minimum eight characters). Moreover, the
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Fig. 11. HMAC calculation.
password must be a combination of small and capital letters as well as digits,
it may also contain special characters. After every unsuccessful login attempt
(entering the wrong password) the additional delay before the PACQ answers
is increased.
The following transmission is encrypted by the generated session key. The
operator can perform a remote configuration of the device, watch values of the
variables (current and archived ones) as well as read and set remote inputs and
outputs.
4. Web page
Any popular web browser (e.g. IE, FireFox, Opera, Chrome) in a current
version is required for page browsing of the PACQ server. Additionally, there
is also a specialized intermediary application, which must be run before. The
application is needed for data encryption/decryption and to protect against
unauthorized redirection to another page for password phishing.
The web pages stored on the server are written in HTML using JavaScript
and CSS. Because of low computing performance of the PACQ server, a big
part of calculations is made by the browser (on the client side). To reduce the
size of transmitted messages from the server, only raw data (as tables) are sent
out, and the rest of actions are made by the browser.
To be able to connect to the website, it is necessary to launch the interme-
diary application which transmits all messages from theb web browser to the
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Fig. 12. Dataflow between the web browser and the PACQ server.
PACQ server. This application encrypts and decrypts messages, and also pro-
tects against password phishing by redirection the user to a fake website (web
spoofing). If you try a direct connection to the server you will only see the in-
formation that the intermediary application is needed and it must be launched
before. The application can be downloaded from a website, but it is important
to download it from a trusted website, preferably a digitally signed one (like
the application itself.) Depending on the user’s access rights to the resources
of PC or personal preferences, the application can be permanently installed on
the computer and launched when the computer starts up, or be activated on
demand.
When the user starts a web browser he has to connect to the intermediary
application, instead of directly to the PACQ server. The application is avail-
able at a localhost (127.0.0.1) and a selected port number, e.g. 32000. After
the connection is established a welcome page is presented. The user enters the
website address of the PACQ server, his username and password. The data are
sent to the intermediary application, which tries to generate a session key and
to establish connection with the PACQ server. If successful, further communi-
cation is continued in secure mode. All requests from intermediary application
and responses from the PACQ server are encrypted (Fig. 12). After decryption
by the intermediary application web pages are transmitted to the web browser.
At the end of the work the user must logout to close connection. The connection
can also be closed automatically if no user activity is detected for a declared
period of time.
Intermediary application is mainly involved in encryption and decryption. It
does not interpret data transmitted from the server and does not store web
pages (besides welcome page). It can be treated as an universal solution. Con-
tent changes on the web server do not affect intermediary application, so it can
be used without modification in other cases.
Depending on the user privileges, the browser page appears in a common
user mode (U), which allows us to view only the data, or an advanced user
mode (A), which also permits to modify some parameters of the system. The
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Fig. 13. Sample page for data channels monitoring. The user can
choose channels for monitoring and page refresh time.
website allows current data reading (Fig. 13) as well as archive browsing. The
size of database mostly depends on the size of DataFlash memory mounted on
the prototype board.
Basic functionalities of the website:
• Setup
Configuration of measuring data channels (name, unit, conversion, in-
terval between I/O module readings, etc.).
• Monitor
Monitoring of current values of data channels, selection of channels
range to be monitored, auto-refresh interval, and displaying the data
of monitored channels as a table.
• Archives
Selection of channels range and the period for searching data, the
results type (table, file – TXT/CSV/DBF), results presentation as a
table or file download.
• Clock
Reading or setting the RTC.
• Logs
Viewing the events (errors, warnings, user activity, etc.).
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• Request
Special commands for I/O control, queries for specific data, service or
diagnostic tests.
• Options
Setup with saving of user preferences for browser settings (the default
channels range, date range, the size of browser window, etc.).
Changing channels configuration (Setup), and Real-Time-Clock (Clock) are
available only for the advanced user (A). Due to security issues, system-critical
settings are set only by using a specialized application, which communicates
with the PACQ server via the RS-232 interface. It is possible to configure the
system using FTP, but because of lack of encryption, this possibility is blocked
by default. It is permissible to unlock the feature using the buttons on the
prototype board, but it works only for a preset time (e.g. 30 minutes) or until
server reset.
5. Conclusions
So far commonly used small industrial devices connected to the Ethernet
network have not supported data encryption. They must be connected to the
network via PC computer to ensure data security. However, it is possible to
provide user authentication as well as data confidentiality and integrity, despite
limited hardware capabilities. An example is the new data acquisition system
with secure remote access described in the paper. The central unit of the system
is the PACQ server with the data acquisition andWWW capability. The control
modules can be programmed in IEC-61131 languages in the CPDev engineering
environment. The PACQ system has been developed in a way to provide secure
connection between the PACQ server and the web browser. Of course, small
devices can not service many users simultaneously, usually only a few, but in
many applications it is just enough. Such systems are more economical because
they do not need additional equipment and consume less electricity. It seems
that the presented solution can be also applied in commercial products.
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